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a b s t r a c t 
This paper examines the welfare implications of rising temperatures. Using a standard VAR, 
we empirically show that a temperature shock has a sizable, negative and statistically sig- 
niﬁcant impact on TFP, output, and labor productivity. We rationalize these ﬁndings within 
a production economy featuring long-run temperature risk. In the model, macro-aggregates 
drop in response to a temperature shock, consistent with the novel evidence in the data. 
Such adverse effects are long-lasting. Over a 50-year horizon, a one-standard deviation 
temperature shock lowers both cumulative output and labor productivity growth by 1.4 
percentage points. Based on the model, we also show that temperature risk is associated 
with non-negligible welfare costs which amount to 18.4% of the agent’s lifetime utility and 
grow exponentially with the size of the impact of temperature on TFP. Finally, we show 
that faster adaptation to temperature shocks results in lower welfare costs. These welfare 
beneﬁts become substantially higher in the presence of permanent improvements in the 
speed of adaptation. 
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Long-term global changes in temperature and precipitation indicate that our entire planet is undergoing a climate change.
Despite a decades-spanning debate, climatologists and economists alike have not reached a consensus about the long-term
economic effects of this dramatic development (see Pindyck, 2013 ). In this paper, we quantify the effect of temperature shifts
on aggregate productivity, labor, consumption, and asset prices. More speciﬁcally, we integrate time-varying temperature
dynamics into a production-based model featuring recursive preferences, long-run risk, and investment adjustment costs.
This setup provides us with the opportunity to expand the scope of the analysis considerably beyond what is possible in an
endowment-based model, e.g., when it comes to the dynamics of investment and labor. 
Temperature statistics suggest that the average temperature level has been increasing over the last century both globally
and among major advanced economies. Using a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) analysis and data on U.S. temperature,
we observe a statistically signiﬁcant and long-lasting negative impact of temperature on total factor productivity (TFP).
Quantitatively, a one-standard deviation temperature shock leads to a drop in one-year future aggregate U.S. TFP growth
by around 0.2 percentage points (pp). When including other macroeconomic variables, the effect on TFP growth becomes
(statistically) weaker. However, we are still able to observe an overall negative impact on the economy as indicated by a An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “How Costly is Global Warming? Implications for Welfare, Business Cycles, and Asset Prices”. 
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 decrease in future consumption growth ( −0.3pp), output growth ( −0.5pp), investment growth ( −1pp) and labor productivity
growth ( −0.5pp), consistent with recent empirical evidence (see Colacito et al., 2016 ). By accounting for the dynamics of
asset prices in the VAR estimation, the negative effect of temperature on future TFP growth remains qualitatively unaffected.
We explain our empirical ﬁndings in a production-based model featuring temperature dynamics. By calibrating the model
to data on the evolution of temperature in the U.S., we are also able to estimate the welfare losses associated with temper-
ature shocks. Our ﬁndings show that, in the long-run, rising temperature has strong adverse effects on key macroeconomic
aggregates, productivity, and asset valuations. Further, our model provides a theoretical equilibrium explanation for the neg-
ative effect of temperature increases on labor productivity found in empirical studies (see Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014; Park,
2016 ). 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to human activities are the most important cause of the climatic developments that
followed the Industrial Revolution in 1750 ( Hartmann et al., 2013 ). Greenhouse gases affect atmospheric composition, leading
to a rise in surface temperature on earth which, in turn, increases the probability of certain types of extreme weather events,
such as heavy rainfalls, ﬂoods, hurricanes, or droughts (see, e.g., Villarini et al., 2013 ). One of the most signiﬁcant greenhouse
gases is carbon dioxide which is released into the atmosphere due to fossil energy usage. There is an ongoing debate on
how to contain CO2 concentration most effectively, and a popular approach is to estimate the overall welfare costs of CO2
emissions in order to impose a fossil fuel taxation that ensures a balance between economic growth and GHG emission (see
Golosov et al., 2014 ). 
A growing number of studies investigates the empirical linkage between economic performance and weather events.
Hsiang (2010) , for instance, documents that industries such as agriculture and tourism, where relocation is either
completely impossible or at least very expensive, are affected most by higher temperatures and increasing rainfall.
Schlenker and Roberts (2009) instead observe that higher temperatures have non-linear effects on crop yields, i.e., above
a certain threshold higher temperatures no longer increase yields but are extremely detrimental. Other recent empirical
ﬁndings suggest also that extreme whether events may lead to an increase in mortality ( Deschênes and Moretti, 2009 ), a
reduction in labor supply ( Zivin and Neidell, 2014 ), and a general drop in ﬁrms’ productivity ( Cachon et al., 2012 ). 
Pricing the risks associated with climate change is essential for comparing the costs for different measures to contain
the adverse climatic developments. A popular approach is to use so-called integrated assessment models (IAMs) ( Nordhaus,
20 08; Stern, 20 07 ). However, the usefulness of these models in estimating the social cost of climate change and increasing
carbon emissions is at the center of an ongoing debate. For example, Pindyck (2013) criticizes IAMs as having little theo-
retical or empirical foundation. He ﬁnds that the model inputs, such as parameter values and functional forms, are chosen
arbitrarily, while the choice of the discount rate reaches an ethical dimension. 1 Furthermore, he stresses that the majority
of economic studies on climate change imposes a loss function on the level instead on the growth rate of output. This as-
sumption does not seem appropriate, since climate change is likely to have a permanent economic impact, e.g., through the
destruction of ecosystems, deaths from weather extremes, or social disruption, and it also contradicts the empirical ﬁndings
provided by Dell et al. (2012) . According to Revesz et al. (2014) , current models also omit adverse effects on labor productiv-
ity, productivity growth, and the value of the capital stock. Finally, one can as well criticize the deterministic nature of IAMs
used for policy analyses, since uncertainty about economic and climate conditions is likely to affect people’s behavior. This
latter point is addressed by Golosov et al. (2014) and Cai et al. (2015) who study climate change within a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. However, as in the traditional IAMs, they model adverse effects of temperature by
means of a damage function on the level of GDP. 
Our DSGE model responds to the issues raised by these critics in a straightforward way. It builds on the production
economy framework introduced by Croce (2014) who shows that long-run productivity risks coupled with preferences for
early resolution of uncertainty have strong implications for macroeconomic quantities and asset prices. 2 We augment the
model in Croce (2014) by temperature dynamics as suggested by Bansal and Ochoa (2011) . Speciﬁcally, temperature shocks
negatively impact the long-run productivity growth in the economy, and this assumption is strongly supported by empirical
evidence. 3 This link between temperature and TFP ensures that the impact of temperature is actually on the growth rate of
macro-aggregates and not on their level. Furthermore, in our general equilibrium framework the agent chooses labor input
optimally. This model feature allows us to investigate the potential effects of temperature changes on employment and labor
productivity. 1 According to Pindyck (2013) one might argue that it is unethical to value the welfare of future generations lower than our own, which implies that 
the ethically appropriate discount rate would equal zero. However, Weitzman (2007) argues that this assumption is inconsistent with actual individual 
behavior. 
2 In this respect, our framework relates to recent studies aimed at matching asset prices via the use of production economies embodying different risk 
channels. Hitzemann (2016) , for instance, shows that oil productivity shocks may help capturing statistical features of aggregate and sectoral stock returns. 
However, his production economy does not generate a sizable equity market returns volatility (see also Croce, 2014; Kung and Schmid, 2015; Donadelli 
and Grüning, 2016 ). Favilukis and Lin (2016) solve this puzzle by introducing an infrequent wage resetting labor market mechanism and a CES production 
function. Gomme et al. (2011) show that a standard RBC model with stochastic relative price of investment goods can (i) produce a relatively high equity 
return volatility and (ii) account for the volatility of the return to business capital, which in the data is lower than the volatility of the S&P 500, even in 
the absence of habit persistence or any type of frictions. 
3 Unlike standard IAMs, our DSGE model explicitly incorporates uncertainty about the future through the introduction of temperature shocks (see also 
Farmer et al., 2015 ). 
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 In the spirit of Bansal and Ochoa (2011) , we parametrize our production-based asset pricing model using results from
the bivariate VAR analysis for temperature and TFP growth and set the model parameters in order to match asset prices,
macroeconomic quantities and U.S. temperature statistics. Since positive temperature shocks reduce TFP growth instanta-
neously, consumption, output, investment, and labor productivity growth decline both in the short-run and over a longer
horizon, which leads to lower asset valuations as well. An important feature of our model is, thus, that it endogenously gen-
erates the negative effect of rising temperatures on labor productivity found in the data (see Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014;
Park, 2016 ). When we express the economic costs of higher temperatures in terms of additional consumption needed to
compensate the agent for temperature risk, we ﬁnd that welfare costs are quite sensitive to the degree to which tempera-
ture changes impact TFP growth. Increasing the negative impact of temperature in absolute terms makes welfare costs rise
exponentially, which provides further evidence for the dramatic impact that temperature-related climate change can have
on the real economic activity. Speciﬁcally, welfare costs amount to 18.4% of composite consumption in our benchmark econ-
omy, but if we allow for higher adverse temperature effects, which are still in the range of empirical estimates, those costs
amount to 36.8%. Moreover, in the model, a rise in temperature is found to have long-lasting negative effects on output and
labor productivity growth. Over a 50-year horizon, a single one-standard deviation shock reduces both cumulative output
and labor productivity growth by 1.4pp. Finally, we study the welfare implications of varying adaptation efforts by agents
in response to temperature changes. A faster adaptation to positive temperature shocks results in lower welfare costs and
vice versa. Policies aiming at increasing the speed of adaptation permanently bring substantial beneﬁts in terms of welfare,
while a permanently slower adaptation can have dramatic consequences with exponentially increasing welfare losses. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence on the effects of temperature
shifts on macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices. Section 3 describes the model. The benchmark calibration and main
quantitative results are presented in Section 4 . Section 5 concludes. 
2. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we present our empirical ﬁndings on temperature changes and their effect on U.S. macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial variables. We show that a positive shock to U.S. temperature has an adverse effect on the growth rate of main
macroeconomic aggregates. Moreover, rising temperatures affect asset prices. These results motivate and provide empirical
support for our production-based model featuring temperature dynamics. 
2.1. Temperature shocks and the U.S. macroeconomy 
Recent studies show that increases in temperature harm real economic activity ( Bansal and Ochoa, 2011; Cai et al., 2015;
Colacito et al., 2016; Dell et al., 2012; Dua et al., 2017 ). We contribute to this evidence by investigating the impact of rising
temperatures on macroeconomic variables and asset prices. Speciﬁcally, we examine the effects of a rise in U.S. temperature
on U.S. TFP growth, consumption growth, output growth, investment growth, labor productivity growth, price-dividend ra-
tio, and risk-free rate. As in Croce (2014) , we use the private business sector multifactor productivity index of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) as a proxy for the TFP. All other real macro-aggregates are obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). In terms of asset pricing data, we obtain the risk-free rate from the Kenneth-French data library and the
market price-dividend ratio is based on Robert J. Shiller’s online dataset. The U.S. temperature (expressed in degrees Fahren-
heit) comes from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental information. All data are annual and span the period from
1950 to 2015. Additional details on data are reported in Appendix A . Our decision to focus on the U.S. is motivated by two
main reasons. First, U.S. data provide us with longer time series and, thus, more data points for the VAR estimations, and
second this approach allows us to compare our empirical evidence with the recent ﬁndings of Colacito et al. (2016) , who
work with more granular, quarterly, U.S. data. 
We start our analysis by estimating a bivariate VAR model for TFP growth and temperature dynamics. Fig. 1 (Panel A)
shows the impulse-response function of TFP growth to a one-standard deviation shock in temperature. The impulse response
is based on the Cholesky orthogonalization of the VAR model with one lag in which temperature shocks are ordered ﬁrst. In
line with existing evidence, our results suggest that a temperature shock reduces productivity growth. The observed negative
effect is rather persistent, lasting for more than ﬁve years and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level after two years. 4 
Climate research argues that there is a strong connection between temperature increases and precipitation (see, among
others, Allen and Ingram, 2009; Solomon et al., 2009 ). Moreover, recent ﬁndings suggest that rainfall undermines economic
growth ( Barrios et al., 2010 ). To account also for this possible side-effect of temperature increases, we repeat our simple
analysis by looking at the precipitation level in the U.S. and its effect on TFP growth. We shed, thus, new light on the
relationship between rising temperatures, precipitation and real economic activity by estimating a bivariate VAR of annual
TFP growth and precipitation in the U.S. analogous to the one for temperature and TFP. The results in Fig. 1 (Panel B) suggest
that there is a negative effect of higher precipitation on TFP growth. The impact is slightly less persistent compared to a
U.S. temperature shock. 4 Note that the U.S. temperature series we use in our empirical analysis is stationary over the sample period from 1950 to 2015. Therefore, we do not 
include a trend in our VAR analysis and do not account for any co-integration relations between variables. Results from the augmented-Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron unit root tests are available upon request. 
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Fig. 1. Impulse response of TFP to temperature and precipitation. 
Notes : This ﬁgure depicts the “Cholesky” orthogonalized impulse response of TFP growth to a temperature (Panel A) and precipitation (Panel B) shock. 
Solid “black” line: estimated impulse response. Dashed “blue” lines: 90% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. Dashed “magenta” lines: 68% bootstrapped conﬁ- 
dence bands. The values reported are deviations from the steady state (i.e., long-run mean) in percentage points. TFP growth is computed from the private 
business sector multifactor productivity index provided by the BLS. Data on U.S. temperature (expressed in degrees Fahrenheit) and U.S. precipitation (ex- 
pressed in Inches) are from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental information. Data are annual and span the period from 1950 to 2015. Additional 
details on data are given in Appendix A . (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this 
article.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Although weather-related phenomena such as increasing rainfall, droughts, storms, or natural disasters in general will
certainly have a non-negligible impact on the aggregate economy, we do not model them explicitly. We believe that we
capture the ﬁrst order effect of temperature increases by looking at temperature dynamics as a broad weather indicator
since many natural disasters are known to be triggered via excessively increasing temperatures. 5 
To assess the impact of temperature shocks on the whole macroeconomy and to compare our model results to the data
in Section 4 , we augment the bivariate model by consumption, output, investment, and labor productivity growth. Fig. 2
shows that overall temperature has a negative impact on future macroeconomic variables. One year after the temperature
shock, TFP growth declines by 0.2pp, consumption growth by 0.3pp, GDP growth by 0.5pp, investment growth by more than
1pp, and labor productivity growth by 0.5pp. The detrimental effects on future TFP are less signiﬁcant but still persist when
additional macroeconomic variables are taken into account. Future GDP and labor productivity drops are signiﬁcant at 10%.
The lagged effect of a temperature shock on the economic variables does not come at a surprise as the shock does not affect
all sectors homogeneously and, thus, propagates only gradually across the economy. This intuition is conﬁrmed by Barrot
and Sauvagnat (2016) who show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks to suppliers, induced by natural disasters, have large short-term
adverse effects on sales growth of their customers over the four consecutive quarters. 
We acknowledge that the estimated temperature effects are relatively large compared to the ﬁndings of related studies.
This might be due to the fact that other studies employ panel data in their analysis and account for variability across regions
and time periods. One of the most turbulent time periods in our sample is the Great Recession and its repercussions. In order
to investigate its effect on our results, we re-run our VAR using data for the period 1950–2007. Impulse responses from this
robustness test are reported in Fig. B.1 in Appendix B and suggest slightly lower temperature adverse effects – over the ﬁrst
three years – for all macroeconomic variables except investment. 6 
The results of the preceding VAR estimations are based on the assumption that temperature is the “most exogenous”
variable and, thus, ordered ﬁrst in the VAR model. As a robustness test, we also compute “generalized” impulse responses
that do not impose theoretical assumptions on the ordering of variables. Impulse responses for TFP growth and other macro-
aggregates are shown in Fig. B.2 in Appendix B . Responses are less signiﬁcant but the direction and size of temperature
effects are basically unchanged. Following a temperature shock, both TFP growth and the remaining macro quantities drop. 7 5 The extension of our production-based model by adding natural (rare) disasters is left for future research. 
6 We obtain similar estimates if we include a dummy variable for the Great Recession period in the full sample. Despite the relatively large future effect 
(i.e., two years after the temperature shock), it is noteworthy to mention that the temperature effect on contemporaneous GDP growth is of similar size as 
in Colacito et al. (2016) for both, the full and the shorter sample period. 
7 As pointed out by Colacito et al. (2016) , it is diﬃcult to obtain highly signiﬁcant results for annual temperature changes on the aggregate economy 
because seasonal and regional effects can be different. However, the authors ﬁnd that negative effects dominate when aggregating seasonal and regional 
contributions. Our results conﬁrm this ﬁnding by indicating a negative impact of rising temperatures on aggregate macroeconomic variables at the annual 
level. 
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Fig. 2. Impulse response of macro-aggregates to temperature. 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports “Cholesky” orthogonalized impulse responses of TFP growth (Panel A), consumption growth (Panel B), output growth (Panel C), 
investment growth (Panel D), and labor productivity growth (Panel E) to a temperature shock. Solid “black” lines: estimated impulse responses. Dashed 
“blue” lines: 90% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. Dashed “magenta” lines: 68% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. The values reported are deviations from 
the steady state (i.e., long-run mean) in percentage points. The VAR(1) model includes U.S. temperature, TFP growth, consumption growth, GDP growth, 
investment growth, and labor productivity growth, in this order. A constant is included. TFP growth is computed from the private business sector multifactor 
productivity index provided by the BLS. All the other macroeconomic variables are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The U.S. temperature 
(expressed in degrees Fahrenheit) is from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental information. Data are annual and span the period from 1950 to 
2015. Additional details on data are given in Appendix A . (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the 
web version of this article.) 
 
 
 
 2.2. Temperature shocks, productivity and asset prices 
To conﬁrm that our ﬁndings on the macroeconomic effects of temperature shocks are robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional variables that might affect productivity growth, we follow the tradition of the long-run risk literature by controlling
for lagged risk-free rate, lagged price-dividend ratio, and lagged productivity growth (see Bansal et al., 2007; Croce, 2014 ).
Impulse responses, in which temperature is ordered last, are presented in Fig. 3 . TFP growth still reacts negatively to a tem-
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Fig. 3. Impulse response of asset prices to temperature. 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports “Cholesky” orthogonalized impulse responses of market price-dividend ratio (Panel A), risk-free rate (Panel B), and TFP growth 
(Panel C) to a temperature shock. Solid “black” lines: estimated impulse responses. Dashed “blue” lines: 90% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. Dashed 
“magenta” lines: 68% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. The values reported are deviations from the steady state (i.e., long-run mean) in percentage points. 
The VAR(1) model includes U.S. temperature, log of price-dividend ratio, risk-free rate, and TFP growth, in this order. A constant is included. TFP growth is 
computed from the private business sector multifactor productivity index provided by the BLS. The risk-free rate is obtained from the Kenneth-French data 
library and the market price-dividend ratio is computed from the Robert J. Shiller online dataset. The U.S. temperature (expressed in degrees Fahrenheit) 
is from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental information. Data are annual and span the period from 1950 to 2015. Additional details on data are 
given in Appendix A . (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 perature shock both on impact and in the future (Panel C). The decline in TFP growth is still signiﬁcant at the 10% level and
lasts for four years. This is further conﬁrmed by the entries in Table B.1 , where we regress TFP growth on the price-dividend
ratio, the risk-free rate, lagged productivity growth, and temperature for the periods from 1950 to 2015 and from 1960 to
2015. Over both periods, the effect of a rise in the level of temperature on TFP growth is relatively strong, negative, and
statistically signiﬁcant. 
The dynamics of the responses of the risk-free rate and the price-dividend ratio are economically plausible, even if not
statistically signiﬁcant. In the case of the price-dividend ratio, two competing effects arise. Namely, lower investment leads
to a reduction of the price of capital and equity, while the decrease in productivity growth reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁts and,
thus, dividends. Our ﬁndings suggest that the latter effect dominates the former. Lower productivity also translates into
a decreasing risk-free rate. In response to contracting equity markets, agents start to invest more into the risk-free asset,
which implies a lower risk-free rate in the periods after the temperature shock. 
Taken together, our empirical analysis suggests that positive temperature shocks have negative consequences on TFP
growth and the growth rates of other macroeconomic aggregates. The negative response of TFP growth is robust to both the
inclusion of additional macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables and the ordering of variables in the VAR. 8 
3. Model 
Our empirical analysis shows that over the last century U.S. temperature had a negative and long-lasting impact on U.S.
macroeconomic variables and, in particular, on TFP growth. To quantify the effects of temperature changes on business cycles8 Our main results are also robust to (i) the use of the utilization-adjusted TFP measure by Basu et al. (2006) as a proxy for aggregate productivity; (ii) 
the employment of global temperature as an alternative indicator of temperature dynamics; and (iii) the use of the level of precipitation as an alternative 
proxy for climate change-related phenomena. 
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 and ﬁnancial markets, we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Speciﬁcally, we augment the
production model featuring long-run productivity risk suggested by Croce (2014) with a stochastic process for temperature
along the lines of Bansal and Ochoa (2011) . The temperature dynamics are coupled with the evolution of TFP such that
rising temperature has a negative impact on long-run productivity growth, the real economy and asset prices, as observed
in the data. 
3.1. Households 
The representative household is equipped with recursive preferences, as in Epstein and Zin (1989) : 
U t = 
[ 
(1 − β) ˜  C 1 −
1 
ψ 
t + β
(
E t [ U 
1 −γ
t+1 ] 
) 1 −1 /ψ 
1 −γ
] 1 
1 −1 /ψ 
. (1)
˜ 
 t is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator for consumption C t and leisure 1 − L t (the remainder of a total time budget of 1, when the
amount of labor is L ): 
˜ C t ≡ ˜ C (C t , L t ) = C νt (A t (1 − L t )) 1 −ν, 
where A t denotes TFP. Multiplying leisure by the level of TFP ensures balanced growth and is interpreted as an adjust-
ment for the standard of living ( Croce, 2014 ). In this setting, γ measures risk aversion, ψ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES), and β is the household’s subjective discount factor. In line with the long-run risk literature, we assume
that the representative household has preferences for early resolution of uncertainty, i.e., γ > 1 
ψ 
. Notice that under power
utility (represented by γ = 1 
ψ 
) the impact of current shocks to productivity growth or temperature is always the same, ir-
respective of the persistence of these innovations. Loosely speaking, long-run productivity and temperature shocks will not
be priced. Differently, under recursive preferences the household cares about uncertainty with respect to future utility and
the risk generated by persistent innovations is priced. As a result, long-lasting shocks affect both prices and quantities (see
Dew-Becker and Giglio, 2016 ). 
In each period, the representative household chooses consumption C t and labor L t to maximize the utility function U t
subject to the following dynamic budget constraint: 
C t + B t+1 + ϑ t+1 (V t − D t ) = W t L t + B t R f t + ϑ t V t , 
where ϑt denotes the number of equity shares in the ﬁrm held from time t − 1 to time t , V t is the cum-dividend market
value of the production sector, D t denotes dividends, B t is the number of bonds held from time t − 1 to time t , R f t is the
gross risk-free rate, and W t represents the frictionless wage. 
9 
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problem lead to the following expression for the stochastic discount factor
(SDF): 
M t ,t +1 = β
(
˜ C t+1 
˜ C t 
)1 − 1 
ψ (C t+1 
C t 
)−1 ( U 1 −γ
t+1 
E t [ U 
1 −γ
t+1 ] 
) 1 /ψ−γ
1 −γ
. (2)
The usual Euler equations for the cum-dividend value of one share of equity in the production sector and the gross risk-free
rate can be written as 
V t = D t + E t [ M t ,t +1 V t+1 ] 
and 
1 
R f t 
= E t [ M t ,t +1 ] . 
3.2. Firms 
The production sector admits a representative, perfectly competitive ﬁrm utilizing capital and labor to produce the out-
put. The production technology is given by 
Y t = K αt (A t L t ) 1 −α, 
where α is the capital share, labor L t is supplied by the household, and A t is TFP. The capital stock evolves according to 
K t+1 = (1 − δK ) K t + G 
(
I t 
K 
)
K t , t 
9 In order to focus exclusively on the mechanism induced by temperature shocks we do not consider any type of labor market or ﬁnancial frictions. 
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 where δK is the depreciation rate of capital. G ( · ), the function transforming investment into new capital, features convex
adjustment costs as in Jermann (1998) : 
G := G 
(
I t 
K t 
)
= α1 
1 − 1 τ
(
I t 
K t 
)1 − 1 τ + α2 . 
The ﬁrm chooses capital, labor, and investment to maximize ﬁrm value: 
V t = max 
L t ,I t ,K t+1 
E t 
[ ∞ ∑ 
s =0 
M t ,t + s D t+ s 
] 
. 
The net proﬁt (i.e., the dividend) of the ﬁrm at any point in time t , D t , is given by output minus investment and labor
costs: 
D t = Y t − I t −W t L t . 
The ﬁrm’s investment decision leads to 
q t = 1 
G ′ 
(
I t 
K t 
) , 
where q t deﬁnes the marginal value of standardized capital which is, in turn, equal to the marginal rate of transformation
between new capital and consumption. The ﬁrm chooses capital such that 
1 = E t 
[ 
M t ,t +1 
1 
q t 
(
αY t+1 − I t+1 
K t+1 
+ q t+1 (G t+1 + 1 − δK ) 
)] 
. 
This can be rewritten as 
1 = E t 
[ 
M t ,t +1 R t+1 
] 
, (3) 
where 
R t+1 = d t+1 + q t+1 
q t 
and 
d t+1 = α Y t+1 
K t+1 
− I t+1 
K t+1 
+ q t+1 G t+1 − δK q t+1 . 
Eq. (3) deﬁnes the asset pricing restriction for the gross equity return R t+1 which is deﬁned as the return per unit of
(normalized) capital. 
3.3. Productivity and temperature dynamics 
The productivity growth rate, 
a t+1 ≡ log (A t+1 /A t ) , in our economy exhibits the following dynamics 

a t+1 = μa + x t + x z t+1 + σa a,t+1 
x t = ρx x t−1 + σx x,t 
x z t+1 = ρz x x z t + τz σz z,t+1 
z t+1 = μz + ρz (z t − μz ) + σz z,t+1 . 
(4) 
where the shocks a,t+1 , x,t+1 , and z,t+1 are independent of each other and are each distributed i.i.d. standard normally.
The unconditional expected growth rate of productivity is μa . The parameter μz captures the long-run U.S. average tem-
perature level. In this economy, short-run productivity shocks are induced by a , t , whereas x , t and z , t indicate long-run
shocks affecting the persistent stochastic components in productivity growth x t and x 
z 
t . 
10 The persistence of long-run macro
and temperature productivity shocks is measured by ρx and ρz x , respectively. We specify two distinct long-run components
for macro and temperature shocks in order to disentangle the timing of those innovations. In contrast to long-run macro
shocks, unexpected temperature increases have a contemporaneous impact on TFP growth as suggested by our empirical
analysis and existing evidence (see Colacito et al., 2016 ). 11 The shock term τz σz z,t+1 is the key innovation in our model rel-
ative to standard production-based approaches, since it represents the impact of temperature changes on TFP. σz z,t+1 is the
unpredictable part of the change in temperature z . The parameter τ z in the dynamics for x z in (4) captures the direction and10 Segal et al. (2015) use a similar approach to examine the effects of uncertainty on long-run consumption growth. In their setting, uncertainty is divided 
into good and bad volatility components which are found to have opposite impact on aggregate growth and asset prices. 
11 Lagged temperature does not affect simulated moments and welfare costs signiﬁcantly. However, the response of macroeconomic variables (in particular 
labor productivity) on impact is different. Results for this alternative speciﬁcation of the aggregate productivity growth rate are available upon request. 
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 the intensity with which unpredictable temperature shocks impact long-run productivity growth. 12 Based on the empirical
analysis presented in Section 2 , we impose τ z < 0 when we study the quantitative implications of the model, i.e., tempera-
ture shocks have a negative impact on long-run expected productivity growth. Whereas temperature has an impact on TFP
growth, we assume that there is no effect in the opposite direction, i.e., productivity shocks do not affect temperature. 
3.4. Labor market 
Firms’ optimal labor allocation condition implies that the wages paid by the ﬁrm must equal the marginal product of
labor: 
W t = (1 − α) Y t 
L t 
. 
The household’s optimal labor allocation leads to 
W t = 1 − ν
ν
(
C t 
1 − L t 
)
, (5)
i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure corresponds to the wage rate that the household
receives. 
3.5. Market clearing 
The output produced by the ﬁrm can be either consumed by the household or invested by the ﬁrm. Therefore, goods
market clearing implies that 
Y t = C t + I t . 
4. Quantitative analysis 
In this section, we present our quantitative results. We calibrate our model according to standard values in the long-
run risk literature and statistics on U.S temperature. This allows the model to reproduce moments that are close to their
empirical counterparts. The model-implied impulse response functions conﬁrm the negative impact of temperature shocks
on macro variables observed in the data. Further, we quantify the welfare costs of temperature risk and estimate the impact
of a one-standard deviation shock on aggregate output growth over a 50-year horizon. Our results lie in the range of existing
estimates. Finally, we introduce stochastic adaptation in our model and show that investment in adaptation can reduce
welfare costs considerably. 
4.1. Calibration 
To be consistent with the frequency of the data used in the empirical analysis in Section 2 , we calibrate our benchmark
model at an annual frequency. Overall, the proposed production economy requires us to specify sixteen parameters: four
for preferences, three relating to the ﬁnal goods production technology, four describing the TFP process, and ﬁve for the
dynamics of the U.S. temperature. 13 
We begin with the standard parameters. Most of the parameters are set in accordance with the long-run risk literature
and are chosen to match the main dynamics of U.S. macroeconomic and asset pricing data. Precisely, as in Croce (2014) , we
set the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, γ and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (IES), ψ , to values of 10 and 2,
respectively (i.e., the representative agent has preference for the early resolution of uncertainty, since γ > ψ −1 ). In line with
Bansal and Ochoa (2011) , the annualized subjective discount factor, β , is ﬁxed at 0.988. The consumption share in the utility
bundle ˜ C is chosen such that the steady-state supply of labor is one third of the total time endowment of the household.
Given the other parameters, this is achieved by setting ν = 0.3416. 
On the ﬁnal production side, we set the capital share α in the production technology equal to 0.345 as in Croce (2014) .
Regarding the adjustment cost parameters, τ is set to 0.7 as in Kung and Schmid (2015) . The constants α1 and α2 are chosen
such that there are no adjustment costs in the deterministic steady state. The depreciation rate of capital δK is set to 0.06 as
in Croce (2014) . The parameter μa is set to a value of 0.013 so that the average annual TFP growth rate is 1.3%, as indicated
by the U.S. data. The volatility of the short-run shock, σ a , is calibrated to match the annual volatility of output growth12 Cai et al. (2015) also study the effects of climate risk when TFP growth is subject to both short and long-run macroeconomic shocks. Different from us, 
they make use of an IAM framework and assume that temperature negatively affects the level of TFP. Moreover, they consider a frictionless economy and 
model population growth over time. 
13 The calibration presented here is meant as a benchmark. We have found that our main results are robust to reasonable variations around this bench- 
mark. 
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Table 1 
Benchmark calibration. 
Parameter Description Source Value 
Preferences 
β Subjective time discount factor 2 0.988 
ψ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1 2 
γ Relative risk aversion 1 10 
ν Consumption share in utility bundle 4 0.3416 
Production and investment parameters 
α Capital share in ﬁnal good production 1 0.345 
δK Depreciation rate of physical capital 1 0.06 
τ Capital adjustment costs elasticity 3 0.7 
TFP 
μa Long-run mean of TFP growth 4 0.013 
σ a Volatility of short-run shocks to TFP growth 4 0.02525 
ρx Long-run macro TFP shock persistence 4 0.92 
σ x Volatility of long-run shocks to TFP 4 0.13 ∗σ a 
Temperature 
μz Long-run mean of U.S. temperature 4 52.43 °F 
τ z Impact of temperature innovations on TFP growth 4 −0.00275 
ρz x Long-run temperature TFP shock persistence 4 0.85 
ρz Temperature persistence parameter 4 0.5 
σ z Volatility of shocks to U.S. temperature 4 0.825 
Notes : This table reports the parameters used in the annual calibration of the model described in Section 3 . Parameter sources: 1 = Croce (2014) , 2 = 
Bansal and Ochoa (2011) , 3 = Kung and Schmid (2015) , 4 = own calibration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 observed in the macroeconomic data (i.e., around 2.3%). We calibrate then the parameters of the long-run productivity risk
process, x t , according to empirical estimates and impose ρx = 0 . 92 and σx = 0 . 13 σa . 14 
We next turn to the “non-standard” parameters (i.e., temperature-related parameters). The persistence of the innovations
in the long-run temperature risk component is chosen to let the model reproduce the persistent effect of temperature
shocks on TFP growth observed in the data. To this end, we set ρz x = 0.85. Changes in ρx z do not (signiﬁcantly) affect the (i)
unconditional correlation between temperature and TFP growth, (ii) unconditional correlation between temperature and GDP 
growth signiﬁcantly, and (iii) autocorrelation of TFP growth. The parameter τ z , measuring the impact of temperature shocks
on TFP growth, is calibrated to a value of −0 . 00275 , which implies in our model that productivity growth declines by around
0.2pp after an unexpected one-standard deviation increase in temperature. Note that this choice also helps us to obtain
an unconditional correlation between TFP growth and between temperature that is close to the data. In the alternative
scenario of higher temperature risk that will also be discussed, a value of −0 . 00375 is assumed. This choice corresponds
to a decline of TFP growth by around 0.3pp and represents the lower bound of the 90% conﬁdence bands of the bivariate
VAR of temperature and TFP growth presented in Fig. 1 . The other parameters regarding temperature dynamics are set to
match the U.S. temperature statistics observed in the data over the period 1950–2015. In particular, we set μz = 52 . 53
(degrees Fahrenheit) and σz = 0 . 825 to match the long-term mean and volatility of U.S. temperature, respectively. Finally, as
suggested by empirical estimates, we set the autoregressive coeﬃcient of U.S. temperature ρz equal to 0.5. 15 
4.2. Temperature risk: macro-quantities and asset prices 
The main results produced by our benchmark calibration (BC) are reported in Table 2 , speciﬁcation [1]. In line with
standard long-run risk models, our framework produces a relatively high equity premium of 2.63% and a relatively low risk-
free rate of 1.23%, close to what is observed on the major capital markets around the world. If we compare these results
with speciﬁcation [2], i.e., a model without temperature effects, we observe that long-run temperature risk is responsible
for a 0.27pp increase in the total equity premium. 14 We estimate the following state-space model: 

a t = 0 . 013 + x t−1 + σa,t ︸︷︷︸ 
0 . 017 ∗∗∗
[0 .0 0 0 0] 
· a,t 
x t = ρx ︸︷︷︸ 
0 . 92 ∗∗∗
[0 .0 0 0 0] 
·x t−1 + σx,t ︸︷︷︸ 
0 . 0021 ∗∗∗
[0 .0 0 0 0] 
·x,t 
where 0.013 corresponds to the estimated U.S. long-run mean of aggregated productivity, ρx is the estimated persistence parameter of the long-run pro- 
ductivity component, σ a , t and σ x , t are the estimated volatilities of the short- and long-run TFP shock, and a , t and x , t are independent and identically 
distributed standard normal shocks. Estimates are obtained using the Newton–Raphson optimization procedure with Marquardt step. Huber–White stan- 
dard errors are employed in order to account for heteroskedasticity. P -values are reported in square brackets. ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 0.1% level. 
15 For space considerations, standard estimates are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 2 
Model versus data: macroeconomic quantities and asset prices. 
Variable Data BC τz = 0 τz = −0 . 00375 
[1] [2] [3] 
Macro quantities 
E (
a ) 1.30 1.33 1.33 1.33 
AC 1( 
a ) 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 
σ ( 
y ) 2.29 2.39 2.37 2.41 
σ ( 
lp ) 2.24 2.04 2.02 2.06 
σ ( 
c )/ σ ( 
y ) 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.82 
σ ( 
i )/ σ ( 
y ) 4.13 1.81 1.81 1.81 
σ (
w ) / σ ( 
y ) 0.91 0.85 0.85 0.85 
σ ( 
l )/ σ ( 
y ) 1.12 0.32 0.32 0.32 
ρ( 
c , 
y ) 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 
ρ( 
c , 
i ) 0.75 0.56 0.56 0.56 
ρ(
w, 
y ) 0.30 0.95 0.95 0.95 
ρ( 
l , 
y ) 0.80 0.59 0.59 0.58 
ρ( 
lp , 
y ) 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.95 
ρ( 
i , 
l ) 0.81 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Temprature 
E (z) 52.43 52.43 52.43 52.43 
σ ( z ) 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
ρ( z , 
a ) −0.15 −0.12 0.00 −0.16 
ρ( z , 
y ) −0.24 −0.12 0.00 −0.16 
Asset prices 
E (R f ) 1.23 1.23 1.28 1.18 
σ ( R f ) 2.16 0.70 0.68 0.71 
E [ R m − R f ] 4.30 2.63 2.36 2.87 
σ (E [ R m − R f ]) 16.80 5.45 5.24 5.63 
ρ( z , R m ) −0.07 −0.25 0.00 −0.33 
Notes : This table reports the main moments for the benchmark calibration (speciﬁcation [1]) and two other model speciﬁcations. In model [2], we 
assume that temperature does not affect long-run productivity growth, i.e., τz = 0 in Eq. (4) . In model [3], by imposing τz = −0 . 00375 , temperature 
shocks are assumed to have a larger impact on productivity growth. The aggregate market return is levered as in Croce (2014) . Models’ entries are 
obtained from repetitions of small-sample simulations (i.e., averages over 10 0 0 simulations of 100 years). E [ ·] , σ ( · ), ρ( · , · ), and AC 1( · ) denote mean, 
volatility, correlation, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, respectively. Means and volatilities are expressed in percentage points. Data on U.S. temperature 
and macro-aggregates are from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental information and Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively. Data are 
annual and run from 1950 to 2015. Additional details on data are provided in Appendix A . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Equity volatility is also slightly higher in the model with temperature effects (i.e., +0.2pp). In line with the impulse re-
sponses presented in Fig. 3 , we observe a negative correlation between the equity market return and the level of temperature
(i.e, −0 . 25 ). The reason for this is that unexpected increases in temperature negatively affect ﬁrms’ productivity and, hence,
their return on capital. In the data, the negative correlation is less pronounced compared to our model. In general, the in-
clusion of temperature risk leads to more pronounced aggregate productivity shifts and, consequently, to relatively worse
long-run growth prospects. This additional effect is priced by the agent since she has a preference for early resolution of
uncertainty. 
When the adverse impact of temperature shocks on TFP growth becomes more severe, as presented in speciﬁcation
[3] with τz = −0 . 00375 , the equity risk premium increases even further to a value of 2.87%. Of course, this implies also a
stronger negative co-movement between temperature and TFP growth as well as between temperature and equity market
returns. 
The negative effects of temperature increases on the macroeconomy are reﬂected by a negative correlation between the
level of temperature and both TFP and output growth, each at −0 . 12 . The moments of macroeconomic quantities are robust
to the inclusion of temperature effects as they do not induce excessive volatility into the business cycle. 
4.3. Inspecting the mechanism 
Unexpected temperature increases are transmitted to the business cycles via their negative effect on TFP growth. More
speciﬁcally, they constitute a negative shock to the long-run risk component of productivity growth. Fig. 4 presents the re-
sponses of selected macro quantities to a temperature shock. In contrast to long-run macro shocks, an unexpected temper-
ature increase has a contemporaneous effect on TFP growth of about −0.22pp on impact. This causes consumption growth
to fall immediately after the shock by about 0.08pp (Panel B). 16 Lower productivity also translates into a strong decline of
investment by −0.5pp. As a result, total output growth declines by more than 0.2pp (Panel C). 16 With lagged temperature effects, consumption would increase on impact because of the dominance of the substitution effect. Lower productivity 
reduces the opportunity costs of consumption and leisure. 
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Fig. 4. Responses of macro quantities to a temperature shock. 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports impulse responses (expressed as deviation from the steady state in percentage points) for a length of 10 years of TFP growth, 

TFP, consumption growth, 
CONS, output growth, 
GDP, investment growth, 
INV, labor growth, 
L, and labor productivity growth, 
LP, with respect 
to a temperature shock, T . All the parameters are calibrated to the values reported in Table 1 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 The key advantage of our model featuring a production sector is that it allows us to analyze the impact of temperature
shocks on labor-related quantities. While labor growth falls on impact, it becomes positive afterwards. According to the
income effect, consum ption of leisure decreases as the agent feels poorer, i.e., she works more. Labor productivity growth
declines both on impact and in the future (Panel F). In the ﬁrst period of the shock, labor growth decreases less than
output growth. Later on, the positive income effect on labor exacerbates the negative effects of output losses. The immediate
decrease of labor productivity in response to a positive temperature shock is in line with existing empirical evidence (see,
among others, Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014; Park, 2016 ). 
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Fig. 5. Responses of ﬁnancial variables to a temperature shock. 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports impulse responses (expressed as deviation from the steady state in percentage points) for a length of 10 years of log of price 
dividend ration, log(P/D) and risk-free rate, Rf , with respect to a temperature shock, T . All the parameters are calibrated to the values reported in Table 1 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The model’s responses of macro quantities are both qualitatively and quantitatively in line with our empirical VAR esti-
mations. This speaks in favor of modeling temperature shocks within a production economy with endogenous investment
and labor decisions. 
Temperature shocks not only affect the real economy but also ﬁnancial markets, as depicted in Fig. 5 . Lower productivity
decreases the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and, hence, dividends. As aggregate investment is depressed, the price of capital depreciates and
negatively impacts equity prices. Since dividends experience a stronger contraction than equity prices in our model, the price
dividend-ratio increases following the shock. These effects are line with our empirical estimations ( Fig. 3 , Panel A). Lower
dividends lead then to a drop in equity prices. This conﬁrms most recent empirical evidence suggesting that temperature
shocks have a negative impact on asset prices (see Bansal et al., 2016; Balvers et al., 2017 ). As a result, the agent demands
more of the risk-free asset, and the increased demand leads to a decline in the risk-free rate (Panel B), which is also in line
with our empirical ﬁndings ( Fig. 3 , Panel B). 
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that climate change in the sense of positive temperature shocks is an important
factor for the long-run evolution of key macroeconomic quantities and ﬁnancial variables. Its impact is uniformly negative
with respect to a wide variety of measures for economic activity and real asset valuations. 17 
4.4. Welfare costs 
To measure the economic costs of temperature shocks, we compute welfare losses that arise due to temperature risk.
The losses are calculated in a fashion similar to Bansal and Ochoa (2011) . Speciﬁcally, we compare the agent’s utility in
an economy with temperature risk to her utility in an economy without temperature risk. Formally, welfare costs 
 are
implicitly deﬁned by: 
E [ U 0 ((1 + 
) ˜  C )] = E [ U 0 ( ˜  C ∗)] , (6)
where ˜ C = { ˜  C t } ∞ t=0 and ˜ C ∗ = { ˜  C ∗t } ∞ t=0 denote the optimal consumption paths with and without temperature risk, respectively. 
Table 3 displays welfare costs for temperature effects in the benchmark economy and for the case with higher adverse
effects of tem perature. Additionally, costs are calculated for two values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We do
this to show that our results are qualitatively robust to whether the substitution ( ψ = 2 , as in the benchmark case) or the
income ( ψ = 0 . 9 ) effect dominates. 
In our benchmark calibration, welfare costs amount to 18.4% of per capita composite consumption which is represented
by the bundle consisting of consumption and leisure. This means that the composite consumption of an agent living in an
economy with temperature risk needs to be increased by almost a ﬁfth in every state and at every point in time to give the
agent the same utility as in an economy without temperature risk. The costs of temperature shocks are sizable since they
have a large and persistent impact on productivity and subsequently on the other macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables. 
In the case where TFP growth is more sensitive to temperature shocks ( τz = −0 . 00375 ), welfare costs increase to 36.8%.
As shown in Fig. 6 , it turns out that welfare costs increase exponentially in the absolute value of τ z . For the largest impact of
temperate on TFP shown in the picture ( τz = −0 . 006 ), welfare costs amount to roughly 120% of composite consumption, i.e.,17 An alternative way to study the equilibrium response of macroeconomic variables is to estimate the VAR on model generated data. We report in 
Appendix B the impulse response functions obtained from a long sample simulation (see Fig. B.3 ). These model-implied responses are very close to the 
theoretical ones and, more importantly, close to the empirical VAR predictions discussed in Section 2 . 
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Table 3 
Welfare costs of temperature shocks. 
BC Temp-effects ↑ 
( τz = −0 . 00275 ) ( τz = −0 . 00375 ) 
ψ [1] [2] 
2.00 18.4% 36.8% 
0.90 6.4% 12.2% 
Notes : This table reports the welfare costs of temperature risk for two different IES values. Welfare costs are deﬁned as 
the percentage increase 
>0 in composite consumption ( ˜ C ) that the household should receive in every state and at 
every point in time in order to be indifferent between living in an economy with full risk exposure (i.e., σ z , σ a , σ x > 0) 
and an economy where temperature risk is eliminated (i.e., τz = 0 ). Speciﬁcation [1] refers to the benchmark calibration 
(i.e., τz = −0 . 00275 ) while speciﬁcation [2] accounts for higher temperature effects (i.e., τz = −0 . 00375 ). 
Fig. 6. Welfare costs. 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports welfare costs for different values of τ z . Welfare costs are computed as in Eq. (6) . All the remaining parameters are set to the 
values shown in Table 1 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 compared to the case without temperature risk the representative household would need more than twice the composite
consumption to achieve the same utility level. 
We also analyze welfare costs for a lower value ψ = 0 . 9 of the IES. This case is interesting in itself since macroeconomists
and ﬁnance researchers do not fully agree whether the IES is indeed greater than one or not. In our model, a lower IES
changes the results quantitatively but not qualitatively. For the benchmark calibration the welfare loss is three times as high
as in the case with lower IES. Welfare costs are increasing in the IES, since a higher IES implicitly makes the agent more
patient, i.e., future consumption has a higher weight in the value function. Therefore, temperature shocks as a source of
long-run macroeconomic risk is much costlier for the agent. 
Compared to our study, welfare costs of temperature risk in the endowment economy of Bansal and Ochoa (2011) are
found to be smaller and amount to only 0.78%. However, the two frameworks cannot be directly compared as introducing
temperature shocks into a production economy yields signiﬁcantly different consumption dynamics. This heterogeneity in 
consumption dynamics is due to the fact that our framework endogenizes movements of capital and investment which, in
turn, works as an ampliﬁcation mechanism. 
In this regard, the presence of investment adjustment costs plays a crucial role. Barlevy (2004) shows that welfare
costs produced by the volatility of productivity are ampliﬁed in economies with capital adjustment costs. Similarly, Croce
(2006) ﬁnds that, given otherwise identical calibrations, welfare costs in a production economy are higher than those ob-
served in an endowment economy since long-run risk in productivity results in a higher level of long-run uncertainty in the
(now endogenous) growth rate of consumption. The economic mechanism behind the impact of adjustment costs works as
follows. When it is costly to change the capital stock, the agent can no longer as easily use investment to reduce the expo-
sure of her consumption process to long-run risk. Adjustment costs generate a negative income effect that lowers both the
level and the growth rate of consumption. The ampliﬁcation through endogenous investment subject to adjustment costs is
therefore the main reason why our results differ signiﬁcantly from the ﬁndings presented by Bansal and Ochoa (2011) . 
To better put our numbers in perspective, temperature-induced welfare losses should be compared to other signiﬁcant
risks modeled in a production framework, e.g., oil price shocks as analyzed by Hitzemann and Yaron (2016) . They ﬁnd wealth
losses of about 2.5%, which are signiﬁcantly smaller than the 18.4% we obtain for our baseline calibration. Obviously this is
only a rough comparison, but it nevertheless indicates that temperature risk is a factor that signiﬁcantly affects an agent’s
welfare. 18 
Overall, our analysis suggests that the welfare costs of rising temperatures are non-negligible. We acknowledge that the
reported welfare costs are based on today’s estimated impact coeﬃcients and do not take into account potential beneﬁts18 There also cannot be a one-to-one mapping between the welfare costs of temperature risk reported in our analysis and the economic costs of rising 
temperatures computed by Golosov et al. (2014) and Cai et al. (2015) . As we focus on temperature risk instead of trend increases in temperature, welfare 
costs are deﬁned as extra consumption needed to compensate the agent for climate risk (i.e., temperature shocks). Golosov et al. (2014) and Cai et al. (2015) , 
instead, compute economic costs in terms of damage to the level of GDP due to trend increases in global temperature. 
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Table 4 
Model versus data: macroeconomic quantities and asset prices. 
Variable Data BC Temp vol ↑ SV 
(1.2 ∗σ z ) ( σv > 0 ) 
[1] [2] [3] 
Macro quantities 
E (
a ) 1.30 1.33 1.33 1.32 
AC 1( 
a ) 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 
σ ( 
y ) 2.29 2.39 2.40 2.40 
σ ( 
lp ) 2.24 2.04 2.05 2.05 
σ ( 
c )/ σ ( 
y ) 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.82 
σ ( 
i )/ σ ( 
y ) 4.13 1.81 1.81 1.81 
σ (
w ) / σ ( 
y ) 0.91 0.85 0.85 0.85 
σ ( 
l )/ σ ( 
y ) 1.12 0.32 0.32 0.32 
ρ( 
c , 
y ) 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 
ρ( 
c , 
i ) 0.75 0.56 0.56 0.56 
ρ(
w, 
y ) 0.30 0.95 0.95 0.95 
ρ( 
l , 
y ) 0.80 0.59 0.59 0.59 
ρ( 
lp , 
y ) 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.95 
ρ( 
i , 
l ) 0.81 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Temperature 
E (z) 52.43 52.43 52.43 52.43 
σ ( z ) 0.94 0.94 1.13 0.94 
ρ( z , 
a ) −0.15 −0.12 −0.14 −0.11 
ρ( z , 
y ) −0.24 −0.12 −0.14 −0.11 
Asset prices 
E (R f ) 1.23 1.23 1.20 1.23 
σ ( R f ) 2.16 0.70 0.70 0.70 
E [ R m − R f ] 4.30 2.63 2.75 2.62 
σ (E [ R m − R f ]) 16.80 5.45 5.54 5.45 
ρ( z , R m ) −0.07 −0.25 −0.29 −0.24 
Notes : This table reports the main moments for the benchmark calibration (speciﬁcation [1]) and two other model speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcation [2] sim- 
ply assumes a higher volatility of temperature. Speciﬁcation [3] introduces time-varying volatility of temperature as deﬁned in Eq. (7) . The aggregate 
market return is levered as in Croce (2014) . The entries for the models are obtained from repetitions of small-sample simulations (i.e., averages over 
10 0 0 simulations of 100 years). E [ ·] , σ ( · ), ρ( · , · ), and AC 1( · ) denote mean, volatility, correlation, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, respectively. Means 
and volatilities are expressed in percentage points. Data on U.S. temperature and macro-aggregates are from the NOAA National Centers for Environ- 
mental information and Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively. Data are annual and run from 1950 to 2015. Additional details on data are provided 
in Appendix A . 
Table 5 
Welfare costs of temp risk: the role of temp-vol changes. 
BC Temp-vol ↑ SV 
( σz = 0 . 825 ) (1.2 ∗σ z ) (σv > 0) 
ψ [1] [2] [3] 
2.00 18.4% 27.5% 18.4% 
0.90 6.4% 9.3% 6.4% 
Notes : This table reports the welfare costs of temperature risk for two different IES values. Welfare costs are deﬁned as the percentage increase 
>0 
in composite consumption ( ˜ C ) that the household should receive in every state and at every point in time in order to be indifferent between living in 
an economy with full risk exposure (i.e., σ z , σ a , σ x > 0) and an economy where temperature risk is eliminated (i.e., τz = 0 ). Speciﬁcation [1] refers to 
the benchmark calibration. Speciﬁcation [2] simply assumes a higher volatility of temperature while speciﬁcation [3] introduces time-varying volatility 
of temperature as deﬁned in Eq. (7) . 
 
 
 from increasing adaptation efforts that are likely to take place in the future (see Park, 2016 ). In this respect, our numbers
should be regarded as an upper bound to the welfare cost of positive temperature shocks. 
4.5. Further inspection of the mechanism 
In this section we perturb the benchmark calibration in order to examine the macroeconomic and welfare effects of
changes in the volatility of temperature. The main results from this additional exercise are reported in Tables 4 and 5 . The
related economic intuitions are addressed in what follows. 19 19 Recent macro-ﬁnance studies show that real labor market dynamics play an important role in bringing both macro-quantities and asset prices closer 
to their empirical counterparts (see, among others, Donadelli and Grüning, 2016 ; Favilukis and Lin, 2016) . Motivated by this evidence, we augment our 
production economy by sticky wages as in Uhlig (2007) to examine whether different degrees of wage stickiness affect macroeconomic quantities, asset 
prices, and welfare costs in the presence of temperature risk. For brevity’s sake, results from this additional analysis are reported in Appendix C.1 . In line 
with other studies, we ﬁnd that wage rigidities (i) make wages less volatile while increasing the volatility and pro-cyclicality of labor due to insurance 
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 4.5.1. Time-varying temperature volatility 
In the benchmark model, we assume that the volatility of temperature does not vary over time. However, in the data
temperature volatility seems to be increasing over time. For instance, in the sub-sample 1950–1975 the standard deviation
of U.S. temperature is equal to 0.55, while it amounts to 0.99 over the period 1976–2015. To account for changes in tem-
perature volatility, σ z , we perform two simple exercises. First, we simply perturb our benchmark calibration by assuming a
higher σ z . More precisely, we examine the implications on macro-quantities, asset prices, and welfare costs in the case of
matching a temperature volatility which is 20% higher than in the benchmark model. Second, for the sake of completeness,
we introduce temperature-based ﬂuctuations in economic uncertainty in the spirit of Croce (2014) and Hitzemann et al.
(2016) . We therefore consider the following speciﬁcation for productivity and temperature dynamics: 

a t+1 = μa + x t + x z t+1 + σa a,t+1 
x t = ρx x t−1 + σx x,t 
x z t+1 = ρz x x z t + τz e v t+1 σz z,t+1 
z t+1 = μz + ρz (z t − μz ) + e v t+1 σz z,t+1 
v t+1 = ρv v t + σv v ,t+1 , 
(7) 
where the process e v t captures time-varying volatility of temperature, and all the shocks are assumed to be mutually inde-
pendent i.i.d. sequences of standard normally distributed random variables, i.e., a,t+1 , x,t+1 , z,t+1 , v ,t+1 ∼ i . i . d . N ( 0 , 1 ). By
means of a standard GARCH(1,1) estimation, we conﬁrm that the conditional variance of U.S. temperature is time-varying. In
addition, the estimates from this time series model suggest ρv = 0 . 59 (i.e., the parameter governing the persistence of tem-
perature conditional volatility) and σv = 0 . 158 (i.e., σv is a relatively small percentage of σ z ). In line with these estimates,
we set the persistence of the stochastic component in temperature volatility, ρv , to 0.6 and its standard deviation, σv , to
0.158. For parsimony, volatility shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to all other shocks in the system. 
Simulated moments and welfare costs for these two alternative exercises are reported in Tables 4 and 5 , respectively. Our
results show that a permanently higher temperature volatility (speciﬁcation [2]) affects mainly asset prices. As suggested by
Eq. (4) , a variation in σ z plays a similar role as a change in the parameter τ z . Consequently, a rise in temperature volatility
by 20% increases temperature risk in the business cycle, resulting in an increase in the equity premium by 0.12pp and in a
strong increase in welfare costs by about 50% compared to the benchmark model. 
Stochastic temperature volatility (speciﬁcation [3]), instead, does not alter both macro quantities and asset prices. This
is due to the fact that data suggest a relatively low persistence and shock size of stochastic volatility for the sample 1950–
2015. Hence, welfare costs of temperature effects are not signiﬁcantly affected by the introduction of time-varying volatility
and remain basically unchanged. Not surprisingly, welfare costs of temperature volatility risk itself amount to only 0.2% in
the benchmark case. Loosely speaking, in our setting stochastic volatility of temperature does not affect lifetime utility in
the long-run. Economically, this is due to the fact that equity provides insurance against orthogonal volatility shocks, i.e.,
agents increase savings and investments into capital in response to volatility risk. 
4.6. Expected losses 
To quantify the long-term effects of temperature increases, we calculate expected losses in output and labor productivity
growth for horizons from 1 to 50 years ahead after a temporary positive shock to U.S. temperature. To this end, we compare
the cumulative growth in an economy in which temperature negatively affects TFP growth to cumulative growth in an
economy without temperature risk. The shock sizes are one and two standard deviations of temperature changes, i.e., 0.825 °F
and 1.65 °F, respectively. 
Panels A and B of Table 6 report results for output growth and labor productivity growth. One can see that a single
initial temperature shock has a sizable long-run negative impact on these variables, which is clearly due to the fact that
a temperature shock induces a long-lasting negative productivity shock. After one year following a one-standard deviation
shock, cumulative output and labor productivity growth both decrease by 0.21pp and 0.12pp, and over a 50-year horizon,
this shock lowers both cumulative output and labor productivity growth by 1.4pp. A U.S. temperature shock of 1.65 °F ex-
acerbates this effect, leading to a decrease in cumulative output and labor productivity growth by 0.41pp and 0.24pp after
one year, respectively. Half a century after the shock, the decrease amounts to 2.8pp each. This exercise shows that in-
creases in temperature adversely affect economic activity not only in the short but also in the long run by reducing growth
perspectives for output and labor productivity. 
The estimates in Table 6 may appear to be small but one should keep in mind that our exercise is based on a single tem-
perature shock only. Since the economy is likely to face a sequence of positive temperature shocks over the next century,
our results are intended to simply illustrate the overall effect of a single shock. We abstain from modeling global warm-
ing as permanent temperature shocks or as a trend increase in U.S. temperature, nor do we try to model global warming
explicitly. 20 against shocks (see Table C.1 ), (ii) raise equity risk premium and equity market volatility (see Table C.1 ), and (iii) have no effects on the welfare costs of 
temperature risk (see Table C.2 ). 
20 In the former case, Colacito et al. (2016) estimate that in 100 years U.S. summer and fall temperatures will be on average 3.6 °F and 2.1 °F higher, 
respectively. This climatic development bears the potential to reduce economic growth by up to 1.5 percentage points, according to their projections. The 
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Table 6 
Long-run effect of a temperature shock. 
Panel A: 
∑ N 
j=1 
y t+ j − N · 
y ∗
Difference in expected output growth after a shock to U.S. temperature 
Shock size 1Y 5Y 10Y 20Y 50Y 
1 std. dev. σ z −0 . 21 −0 . 67 −0 . 92 −1 . 16 −1 . 40 
2 std. dev. σ z −0 . 41 −1 . 33 −1 . 84 −2 . 33 −2 . 81 
Panel B: 
∑ N 
j=1 
lp t+ j − N · 
lp ∗
Difference in expected labor productivity growth after a shock to U.S. temperature 
Shock size 1Y 5Y 10Y 20Y 50Y 
1 std. dev. σ z −0 . 12 −0 . 62 −0 . 92 −1 . 18 −1 . 41 
2 std. dev. σ z −0 . 24 −1 . 24 −1 . 83 −2 . 37 −2 . 83 
Notes : This table reports the cumulative change in growth over 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 years in percentage points after a temporary temperature shock. 
The cumulative growth in an economy without such a shock is compared to that in an economy with shocks to temperature z t . Speciﬁcally, we report (∑ N 
j=1 
y t+ j 
)
− N · 
y ∗ and 
(∑ N 
j=1 
lp t+ j 
)
− N · 
lp ∗ where 
y t+ j ( 
lp t+ j ) is the log growth rate of total output (labor productivity), and 
y ∗ ( 
lp ∗) is 
the steady-state growth rate in the economy without a shock (i.e., with σz = 0 ). For example, the entry −0 . 67 for a horizon of 5 years in the ﬁrst row 
of Panel A means that cumulative growth over these 5 years has been 0.67 percentage points lower than it would have been without the temperature 
shock. The amount of lost output (Panel A) and labor productivity (Panel B) growth is reported for temperature shocks amounting to one and two 
standard deviations, i.e., to 0.825 °F and 1.65 °F, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.7. Temperature shocks, adaptation, and welfare costs 
The literature on adaptation suggests that damages from climate change can be reduced by continued economic devel-
opment and technological innovation. 21 One prominent example in this respect is the invention of air conditioning at the
beginning of the 20th century. Factories, banks, movie theaters, and many other businesses in the southern states of the
U.S. were quick to utilize the new indoor climate control device in production and service. Torrid summer months became
bearable for employees and customers, alike. Consequently, the South experienced a signiﬁcant increase in labor productiv-
ity, output, and real wages such that the economic gap relative to the rest of the nation could be considerably reduced (see
Arsenault, 1984; Oi, 1996 ). 
Given the evidence that technological progress is likely to affect the overall economic costs of climate risk, we augment
our model in order to take into account changing adaptation efforts in the future and the way they affect the parameters
governing the size of welfare costs. In our baseline model, temperature increases affect the real economy via three parame-
ters: the sensitivity of TFP growth to a temperature shock on impact, measured by τ z , the persistence of the negative effect
on TFP growth, measured by ρz x , and the standard deviation of temperature shocks, σ z . Actually, our model already features
an adaptation mechanism. As suggested by Tol (2002) , ρz x can be interpreted as a parameter governing the speed of adapta-
tion to temperature shocks. A temperature shock does not reduce TFP growth permanently but according to the persistence
parameter ρz x . This exogenously imposed adaptation mechanism can be interpreted as the agents’ adaptation effort needed
to revert back to the old growth path. Therefore, the higher the speed of adaptation the lower ρz x . 
To analyze how the speed of adaptation affects welfare costs, we computed the latter for different values of the parameter
ρz x , where ρ
z 
x varies from 0 to 0.9. Results from this sensitivity analysis are plotted in Fig. 7 and suggest that welfare costs
increase exponentially in the parameter ρz x . Note that the speed of adjustment in our benchmark economy is rather low (i.e.,
ρz x = 0 . 85 ). As indicated by Fig. 7 , even small changes in ρz x lead to sizable welfare costs/gains. On the one hand, increasing
adaptation efforts would lower welfare costs more than proportionally. In the extreme case of immediate adjustment ( ρz x =
0 ), welfare costs of temperature risk could be reduced to about 0.4%. On the other hand, decreasing adaptation efforts
(i.e., ρz x > 0 . 9 ) could have dramatic consequences. Our simple analysis indicates the need of policies that aim at improving
agents’ ability to adapt faster to temperature shocks. Above all, this goal can be reached by the implementation of new
technologies. However, given uncertainty surrounding the real economic impact of climate change, the political, economic
and technological mechanisms to abate emissions and thus slow down rising temperatures are still slow (see also Tol, 2002 ).
In the exercise above, we assume that the speed of adjustment can be reduced immediately and permanently to a chosen
value. In what follows, we make the setup more realistic by assuming the speed of adjustment to be stochastic and time-
varying. This reﬂects agents’ willingness to modify their adaptation effort over time and uncertainty around the adaptation-
related beneﬁts. Therefore, a stochastic speed of adaptation would introduce an additional type of risk that may have welfarelatter modeling approach involves very high parameter uncertainty as the ongoing climate change is likely to impact future temperature dynamics. In 
contrast, in our case of a temporary shock, future temperature dynamics do not matter since the shock materializes in the ﬁrst period only. 
21 Recent empirical studies on the potential gains induced by adaptation to climate change in the U.S. are Deschnes and Greenstone (2011) , Burke and 
Emerick (2016) and Park (2016) . 
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Fig. 7. Welfare costs and speed of adaptation. 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports welfare costs for different values of ρz x . Welfare costs are computed as in Eq. (6) . All the remaining parameters are set to the 
values shown in Table 1 . 
Table 7 
Welfare costs and “Stochastic” adaptation. 
BC Temp-effects ↑ Adaptation 
( τz = −0 . 00275 ) ( τz = −0 . 00375 ) σ > 0 
[1] [2] 
Panel A: 
ρ(z,t , ,t ) = 0 18.4% 36.8% 0.2% 
Panel B: 
ρ(z,t , ,t ) = −0 . 99 16.7% 34.2% −1.3% 
Notes : This table reports welfare costs of temperature risk and stochastic adaptation. Welfare costs of temperature risk are deﬁned as the 
percentage increase 
>0 in composite consumption ( ˜ C ) that the household should receive in every state and at every point in time in 
order to be indifferent between living in an economy with full risk exposure (i.e., σz , σa , σx , σ > 0 ) and an economy where temperature 
risk is eliminated (i.e., τz = 0 ). Speciﬁcation [1] refers to the benchmark calibration (i.e., τz = −0 . 00275 ) while speciﬁcation [2] accounts for 
higher temperature effects (i.e., τz = −0 . 00375 ). The last column displays welfare costs of stochastic speed of adaptation which are deﬁned 
as the percentage increase 
>0 in composite consumption ( ˜ C ) that the household should receive in every state and at every point in time 
in order to be indifferent between living in an economy with full risk exposure (i.e., σz , σa , σx , σ > 0 ) and an economy where adaptation 
risk is eliminated (i.e., σ = 0 ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 implications. Formally, we augment Eq. (4) by introducing stochastic speed of adaptation: 

a t+1 = μa + x t + x z t+1 + σa a,t+1 
x t = ρx t−1 + σx x,t 
x z t+1 = ρz x,t x z t + τz σz z,t+1 
ρz x,t = e t ρz x 
t = ρt−1 + σ,t 
z t+1 = μz + ρz (z t − μz ) + σz z,t+1 . 
(8) 
Hence, the speed of adjustment ρz x,t ﬂuctuates around ρ
z 
x , i.e., the speed of adjustment in our benchmark economy. Note
that when t is identically equal to zero, ρz x,t = ρz x . We set the persistence of adaptation shocks, ρ, to 0.95 (long-lasting
adaptation effects) and the volatility, σ, to a small fraction of temperature volatility (15% of σ z ). 
Welfare costs of both temperature and adaptation risk are presented in Table 7 . Two interesting cases worth studying
in our model are: (i) shocks to the speed of adaptation that are orthogonal to temperature shocks and (ii) adaptation and
temperature innovations are correlated. In Panel A, it is assumed that adaptation shocks are orthogonal, i.e., ρ(z,t , ,t ) = 0 ,
while in Panel B they are assumed to be strongly negatively correlated with temperature shocks, i.e., ρ(z,t , ,t ) = −0 . 99 .
The latter means that agents adjust adaptation effort in response to temperature changes. More speciﬁcally, agents increase
the speed of adjustment after a positive temperature shock with the aim to reduce the long-lasting adverse effects on
productivity. 
When time-varying adaptation efforts are independent of temperature changes, they produce small welfare costs of only
0.2% while the economic losses due to temperature risk remain basically unaffected. Hence, the agent’s lifetime utility is not
much affected by uncertainty in the speed of adaptation. Different results are obtained once one accounts for a strong link
between adaptation and temperature innovations. In this case, a positive shock to temperature triggers increasing speed of
adaptation via a reduction in the persistence of temperature effects. This occurs with one lag meaning that agents adjust to
temperature changes in the next period. Compared to the case with uncorrelated shocks, welfare costs of temperature risk
are reduced by 1.7pp in the benchmark case and by 2.6pp when temperature effects are higher. Accordingly, welfare costs of
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 stochastic adaptation become negative and amount to −1.3% meaning that the lifetime utility of the agent increases when
the speed of adaptation reacts in response to temperature shocks. 22 
Our ﬁndings suggest that policies aiming at increasing the speed of adaptation can have substantial beneﬁts for social
welfare. Modeling the speed of adaptation as an endogenous outcome of agents’ decisions, e.g., investments in new tech-
nologies, will be an interesting topic for future research. Another important issue that we do not consider is a cost-beneﬁt
analysis in which we compare the beneﬁts of adaptation efforts with their costs. Recent research suggests that increasing
adaptation efforts may entail substantial costs (see Burke and Emerick, 2016; Park, 2016 ). Lastly, we do not study other
possible adaptation mechanisms in our model. All these aspects are subject to future research. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Our paper represents a ﬁrst step towards the joint analysis of real business cycles, asset pricing, and temperature changes
in one integrated production-based framework. Our approach is motivated by the empirical evidence that shocks to tem-
perature adversely impact TFP growth and a number of key macro-aggregates in the United States. We augment the long-
run risk-based production economy of Croce (2014) by time-varying temperature dynamics. An important advantage of our
model is its ability to simultaneously match the dynamics of U.S. TFP, temperature, and asset prices. Hence, we are able to
quantify the impacts of temperature shocks on both the business cycle and ﬁnancial markets. 
Our results suggest that temperature shocks have a negative impact on both economic activity and ﬁnancial markets by
lowering long-run growth prospects and asset valuations. Over a 50-year horizon, temperature risk leads to non-negligible
losses in cumulative output and labor productivity growth. Furthermore, our model shows that the overall welfare costs of
temperature risk can amount to 18.4% of the agent’s lifetime utility. 
An important driver of welfare costs is the speed of adjustment in response to temperature shocks. Lower welfare costs
can be achieved by a faster adaptation to increasing temperatures while a slower adaptation increases welfare costs even
more. Most importantly, a permanent change in the speed of adaptation affects welfare costs substantially. In this respect,
increasing adaptation efforts can reduce welfare costs to a large extent while decreasing efforts may have drastic conse-
quences for agents’ welfare. 
Our model is not fully general. For instance, it does not include features such as technological innovation (which might
mitigate adverse effects of temperature changes) or social unrest (which might even exacerbate the pure growth and produc-
tivity effects we have analyzed here). In the context of adaptation to climate change, the speed of adjustment to temperature
increases may be endogenously determined by, e.g., agents’ investments in new technologies. Moreover, other adaptation
mechanisms such as a gradual reduction in the sensitivity of the economy to temperature shocks should be considered as
well. Another important aspect missing in the model are possible feedback effects between technology and temperature
dynamics. Such extensions may have important policy implications and are left for future research. Still, we believe that our
model allows us to address some of the issues raised by Pindyck (2013) and Revesz et al. (2014) concerning the structure of
models designed to measure the economic costs of climate change. 
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Appendix A. Data 
A.1. Macro quantities 
Real data on GDP, consumption, and investment (in billions of chained (2009) dollars) are obtained from the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (NIPA Table 1.1.6). Data on
labor and labor productivity are retrieved from the FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Labor is proxied by hours
worked in the non-farm business sector [HOANBS] while labor productivity is proxied by real GDP per capita (billions of
chained (2009) dollars, [A939RX0Q048SBEA]). Wages are deﬁned as the total wage bill (i.e., the sum of compensation of
employees in private industries and supplements to wages, NIPA Table 2.1) divided by the number of private employees22 An alternative way to model adaptation in by introducing a varying coeﬃcient in front of the long-run temperature risk component x z t+1 . This can 
be interpreted as adaptation efforts to reduce the impact of temperature shocks on TFP growth. Results are qualitatively similar to our analysis based on 
changes in the parameters τ z and ρz x and available upon request. 
350 M. Donadelli et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 82 (2017) 331–355 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (NIPA Table 6.4). Data on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in the private business sector (excluding government enterprises)
are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Data are annual and span the period from 1950 to 2015. 
A.2. Asset prices 
The risk-free rate is the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates), obtained from the Kenneth-French
data library. The market price-dividend ratio is computed from the Robert J. Shiller online stock market dataset. The equity
market return is computed from the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market index (closed-adjusted price), obtained from Yahoo
Finance. Nominal prices are converted to real using the personal consumption expenditures deﬂator which is obtained from
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (NIPA Table 1.1.9).
Data are annual and span the period from 1950 to 2015. 
A.3. Temperature and precipitation 
Data on U.S. temperature (expressed in degrees Fahrenheit) and U.S. precipitation (measured in inches) have been
retrieved from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental information, Climate at a Glance: U.S. Time Series, from
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/ . Employed temperature and precipitation data are annual and span the period from 1950
to 2015. 
Appendix B. Additional empirical evidence 
Table B1 
TFP growth dynamics. 
Period: 1950–2015 Period: 1960–2015 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log ( P / D ) 1.72 1.67 2.85 ∗ 2.60 ∗
[1.27] [1.28] [1.49] [1.52] 
R f −0.11 −0.11 −0.04 -0.04 
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] 

T F P(−1) 0.04 0.06 
[0.11] [0.13] 
T −0.40 ∗ −0.38 ∗ −0.46 ∗∗ −0.42 ∗∗
[0.20] [0.19] [0.22] [0.20] 
R 2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Notes : This table presents predictability evidence for TFP growth. Columns (1) and (3) report estimated projection coeﬃcients on the log price-dividend 
ratio, log ( P / D ), the risk-free rate R f , and temperature T for the period 1950–2015 and 1960–2015, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) report estimated 
projection coeﬃcients on the price-dividend ratio, the risk-free rate, lagged TFP growth 
T F P(−1) , and temperature for the period 1950–2015 and 
1960–2015, respectively. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are computed using the Newey-West var-cov estimator with 3 lags. ∗∗ and ∗
denote signiﬁcance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. TFP growth is computed from the private business sector multifactor productivity index 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The risk-free rate is obtained from the Kenneth-French data library, and the market price-dividend ratio 
is computed from the Robert J. Shiller online dataset. The U.S. temperature (expressed in degrees Fahrenheit) is from the NOAA National Centers for 
Environmental Information. The data employed in the regressions are annual and span the period from 1950 to 2015. 
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Fig. B1. Impulse response of macro-aggregates to temperature (1950–2007). 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports “Cholesky” orthogonalized impulse responses of TFP growth (Panel A), consumption growth (Panel B), output growth (Panel 
C), investment growth (Panel D), and labor productivity growth (Panel E). Solid “black” lines: estimated impulse responses. Dashed “blue” lines: 90% 
bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. Dashed “magenta” lines: 68% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. The values reported are deviations from the steady state (i.e., 
long-run mean) in percentage points. The VAR(1) model includes U.S. temperature, TFP growth, consumption growth, GDP growth, investment growth, and 
labor productivity growth, in this order. A constant is included. TFP growth is computed from the private business sector multifactor productivity index 
provided by the BLS. All the other macroeconomic variables are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The U.S. temperature (expressed in 
degrees Fahrenheit) is from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental information. Data are annual and span the period from 1950 to 2007. Additional 
details on data are given in Appendix A . (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this 
article.) 
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Fig. B2. Generalized impulse responses (macro-aggregates vs. temperature shocks). 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports the “generalized” impulse responses of TFP, consumption, output, investment, and labor productivity growth to a temperature 
shock. Solid “black” lines: estimated impulse responses Dashed “blue” lines: 90% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. Dashed “magenta” lines: 68% bootstrapped 
conﬁdence bands. The values reported are deviations from the steady state (i.e., long-run mean) in percentage points. The VAR(1) model includes U.S. tem- 
perature, TFP growth, consumption growth, GDP growth, investment growth, and labor productivity growth. A constant is included. TFP growth is computed 
from the private business sector multifactor productivity index provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. All the other macroeconomic variables are taken 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The U.S. temperature (expressed in degrees Fahrenheit) is from the NOAA National Centers for Environmental 
Information. Data are annual and span the period from 1950 to 2015. Additional details on the data are given in Appendix A . (For interpretation of the 
references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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Fig. B3. Model-implied impulse-responses to temperature shocks. 
Notes : This ﬁgure reports “Cholesky” orthogonalized impulse-responses of TFP growth (Panel A), consumption growth (Panel B), output growth (Panel C), 
investment growth (Panel D), and labor productivity growth (Panel E) to a temperature shock. Solid “black” lines: estimated impulse responses Dashed 
“blue” lines: 90% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. Dashed “magenta” lines: 68% bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. The values reported are deviations from 
the steady state (i.e., long-run mean) in percentage points. The VAR(1) model includes U.S. temperature, TFP growth, consumption growth, GDP growth, 
investment growth, and labor productivity growth, in this order. A constant is included. All series are obtained from a long sample simulation of 10,0 0 0 
observations (i.e. 10,0 0 0 years). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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 Appendix C. Additional quantitative results 
C1. The role of wage rigidities 
In order to account for labor market frictions, we follow Uhlig (2007) and assume that only a fraction of the total labor
supply reaches the market at the optimal wage. Formally, 
W t = (e μa W t−1 ) ξ (W u t ) 1 −ξ , 
where ξ measures the degree of wage stickiness and W u t represents the frictionless wage as deﬁned by the household’s
optimal labor allocation 
W u t = 
1 − ν
ν
(
C t 
1 − L 
)
. t 
Table C1 
Model versus data: macroeconomic quantities and asset prices. 
Variable Data BC ξ = 0 . 35 ξ = 0 . 5 
[1] [2] [3] 
Macro quantities 
E (
a ) 1.30 1.33 1.33 1.33 
AC 1( 
a ) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
σ ( 
y ) 2.29 2.39 2.71 2.98 
σ ( 
lp ) 2.24 2.04 1.88 1.76 
σ ( 
c )/ σ ( 
y ) 0.79 0.82 0.87 0.90 
σ ( 
i )/ σ ( 
y ) 4.13 1.81 1.65 1.54 
σ (
w ) / σ ( 
y ) 0.91 0.85 0.69 0.59 
σ ( 
l )/ σ ( 
y ) 1.12 0.32 0.41 0.52 
ρ( 
c , 
y ) 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.93 
ρ( 
c , 
i ) 0.75 0.56 0.60 0.63 
ρ(
w, 
y ) 0.30 0.95 0.95 0.91 
ρ( 
l , 
y ) 0.80 0.59 0.84 0.88 
ρ( 
lp , 
y ) 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.91 
ρ( 
i , 
l ) 0.81 0.89 0.90 0.85 
Temperature 
E (z) 52.43 52.43 52.43 52.43 
σ ( z ) 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
ρ( z , 
a ) −0.15 −0.12 −0.12 −0.12 
ρ( z , 
y ) −0.24 −0.12 −0.11 −0.11 
Asset prices 
E (R f ) 1.23 1.23 1.17 1.11 
σ ( R f ) 2.16 0.70 0.90 1.13 
E [ R m − R f ] 4.30 2.63 2.88 3.05 
σ (E [ R m − R f ]) 16.80 5.45 6.09 6.56 
ρ( z , R m ) −0.07 −0.25 −0.23 −0.21 
Notes : This table reports the main moments for the benchmark calibration (speciﬁcation [1]) and two model speciﬁcations with wage 
stickiness. In model [2], we set ξ = 0 . 35 as in Uhlig (2007) . In model [3], we assume higher wage rigidities by imposing ξ = 0 . 5 . The 
aggregate market return is levered as in Croce (2014) . Models’ entries are obtained from repetitions of small-sample simulations (i.e., aver- 
ages over 10 0 0 simulations of 10 0 years). E [ ·] , σ ( · ), ρ( · , · ), and AC 1( · ) denote mean, volatility, correlation, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, 
respectively. Means and volatilities are expressed in percentage points. Data on U.S. temperature and macro-aggregates are from the NOAA 
National Centers for Environmental information and Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively. Data are annual and run from 1950 to 2015. 
Additional details on data are provided in Appendix A . 
Table C2 
Welfare costs of temp risk: the role of wage rigidities. 
BC WR WR ↑ 
( ξ = 0 ) ( ξ = 0 . 35 ) (ξ = 0 . 5) 
ψ [1] [2] [3] 
2.00 18.4% 18.4% 18.4% 
0.90 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 
Notes : This table reports the welfare costs of temperature risk for two different IES values. Welfare costs are deﬁned as the percentage 
increase 
> 0 in composite consumption ( ˜ C ) that the household should receive in every state and at every point in time in order to be 
indifferent between living in an economy with full risk exposure (i.e., σ z , σ a , σ x > 0) and an economy where temperature risk is eliminated 
(i.e., τz = 0 ). Speciﬁcation [1] refers to the benchmark calibration. In speciﬁcation [2], we set ξ = 0 . 35 as in Uhlig (2007) . In speciﬁcation 
[3], we assume higher wage rigidities by imposing ξ = 0 . 5 . 
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